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Under the Kyoto Protocol Ireland is committed to ensuring that its greenhouse gas emission levels are at or below 113 per cent of 1990 levels for the years 2008–2012. Irish emissions have already exceeded this limit by approximately 10 to 15 per cent and must be reduced if the Kyoto Protocol targets are to be met. In this context, and drawing on relevant theory and research, this paper discusses the rationale for, and the potential impact of, government intervention in the market for carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. The use of a Carbon Tax as a policy tool in reducing CO2 emissions is examined from both economic and taxation perspectives. Particular attention is paid to the Irish National Climate Change Strategy formulated in 2000 and the consultation process on implementing a Carbon Tax initiated by the Department of Finance in 2003. In September 2004 the Irish Government decided not to implement the proposed Carbon Tax. Submissions from interested parties on the carbon tax consultation process are reviewed against the rationale for implementation of such a tax. The body of evidence presented in this paper supports the implementation of a Carbon Tax—suggesting that the decision not to implement such a tax may have been a lost opportunity. The paper argues that a well‐designed Carbon Tax for Ireland, a simple levy on a close proxy for emissions, would be effective in influencing taxpayer behaviour bringing about a reduction in Ireland's CO2 emissions and supporting the polluter pays principle. In the absence of a carbon tax Ireland's Kyoto target is unlikely to be met and the consequent financial penalties will fall on all taxpayers. The paper concludes that the Irish Government should revisit this decision.

With the use of a two-region monopolistically competitive model, the paper primarly studies how unilateral changes in a country's intra-regional and/or inter-national transport costs affect its own and its trading partner's welfare. Moreover, by considering a three-region monopolistically competitive model that consists of an external region and two integrated regions, with the one having a location advantage with respect to the external market, the paper studies how within-country asymmetries in transport costs affect trading partner's welfare.

This paper examines how investments in the infrastructure affect welfare in the home country and in its trading partner by primarily using a model with direction-specific intra-regional and inter-national trade costs. Moreover, it focuses on the within-country asymmetries in transportation costs and their impacts on trading partners' welfare.

The first model shows that a unilateral reduction in a country's transport costs is beneficial for its domestic firms, while it hurts firms located in its trading partner country. Other findings show that an equal bilateral reduction in inter-national transport costs is a Pareto improvement, since it is beneficial for both countries. The second model shows that a reduction in intra-regional transport costs benefits the two integrated regions, while it has no impact on the welfare of the external region.

Two monopolistically competitive models are considered, in order to study how investments in the infrastructure affect welfare in the home country and in its trading partner. Interestingly, the models sheds light on an important mechanism, that of firm-delocation effect.